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Abstract 
 
We test how active management of bank credit risk exposure affects capital structure, 
capital budgeting and profits.  We find that banks that rebalance their C&I loan portfolio 
exposures by both buying and selling loans hold less capital and lower levels of liquid 
assets than other banks; they also lend more to businesses, both as a percentage of total 
assets and as a percentage of their overall lending, and they enjoy higher profits.  The 
results hold controlling for bank size and holding company affiliation and are robust over 
time.  We conclude that increasingly sophisticated risk management practices in banking 
are likely to improve the availability of bank credit. 
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I.    Introduction 
Banking is a tough juggling act.  As we move into the new century and the new 
regulatory and economic environment, it certainly feels like the number of balls in the air 
is increasing.  By its very nature, banking is an attempt to manage multiple and 
seemingly opposing needs.  Banks stand ready to provide liquidity on demand to 
depositors through the checking account and to extend credit as well as liquidity to their 
borrowers through lines of credit (Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 1999).  Because of these 
fundamental roles, banks have always been concerned with both solvency and liquidity.  
Traditionally, banks held capital as a buffer against insolvency, and they held liquid 
assets – cash and securities – to guard against unexpected withdrawals by depositors or 
draw downs by borrowers (Saidenberg and Strahan, 1999). 
In recent years, risk management at banks has come under increasing scrutiny.  
Banks and consultants have attempted to sell sophisticated credit risk management 
systems that can account for borrower risk (e.g. rating) as well as correlations across 
borrowers in a large portfolio.  Regulators have also begun to consider using banks’ 
internal credit models to devise capital adequacy standards (see Basel 1999 Consultative 
Proposal). 
Why do banks bother?  In a Modigliani –Miller world, firms generally should not 
waste resources managing risks because shareholders can do so more efficiently by 
holding a well-diversified portfolio.  Banks (intermediaries) would not exist in such a 
world, however.  Financial market frictions such as moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems require banks to invest in private information that makes bank loans illiquid 
(Diamond, 1984).  Since these loans are illiquid and thus costly to trade, and since bank 
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failure itself is costly when their loans incorporate private information, banks have an 
incentive to avoid failure through a variety of means, including holding a capital buffer of 
sufficient size, holding enough liquid assets, and engaging in risk management.  Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein (1993) present a rigorous theoretical analysis of how these frictions 
can affect banks’ capital budgeting decisions.  According to their model, active risk 
management can allow banks to hold less capital and to invest more aggressively in risky 
and illiquid loans. 
In this paper, we test how risk management affects bank capital structure and 
capital budgeting decisions.  Hedging activities in the form of derivatives trading and 
swap activities - activities that allow banks to manage their market risks - have been 
shown to influence firm performance and risk (e.g. Brewer, Minton, and Moser, 1999).  
Our approach is to test whether banks that are better able to trade credit risks in the loan 
sales market experience significant benefits.  We find clear evidence that they do.  In 
particular, banks that purchase and sell their loans conserve on capital (per dollar of 
assets) and hold a smaller buffer of liquid assets.  Moreover, banks that are on both sides 
of the loan sales market also experience larger declines in both capital and liquid assets 
than banks that only sell loans but don’t buy them.  This is important because it suggests 
that active rebalancing of credit risk – buying and selling – allows banks to alter their 
capital structure.  Are key results are therefore not driven by reverse causality whereby 
banks looking to increase their capital and liquidity go out and sell loans. 
Consistent with Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), we also find that credit risk 
management through active loan purchase and sales activity affects capital budgeting.  
Banks that purchase and sell loans hold more risky loans (C&I loans and commercial real 
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estate loans), both as a percentage of the balance sheet and as a percentage of the loan 
portfolio; they also experience higher profits.  Again, these results are especially striking 
because banks that manage their credit risk (buy and sell) experience greater increases in 
risky lending and profits than banks that merely sell their loans (but don’t buy them). 
In the next section, we discuss previous studies of risk management and capital 
budgeting.  We then explain our empirical methods and results in Section III.  We 
conclude in Section IV with implications for the likely effects of recent innovations in 
bank risk management for the availability of bank credit. 
 
II.  What We Know about Risk Management 
While a significant amount of work has gone into analyzing risk management in 
banking, the issues are not specific to financial institutions.  Non-financial firms also 
manage their risk exposures extensively, and this in turn affects their capital budgeting 
decisions, profitability, and value.  Allayannis and Weston (1999), for example, examine 
the use of foreign currency derivatives in a sample of large U.S. nonfinancial firms and 
report that there is a positive relation between firm value and the use of foreign currency 
derivatives.  Their evidence suggests that hedging raises firm value.  Minton and Schrand 
(1999) use a sample of non-financial firms in 37 industries and find that cash flow 
volatility leads to internal cash flow shortfalls, which in turn lead to higher costs of 
capital and forgone investments.  Firms able to minimize cash flow volatility seem to be 
able to invest more.   
In contrast to our work, extant studies of bank loan sales have not emphasized the 
links between risk management, capital structure and capital budgeting.  Recent papers 
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have rather viewed loan sales as a response to regulatory costs (Benveniste and Berger, 
1987), as a source of nonlocal bank capital to support local investments (Carlstrom and 
Samolyk 1995, Pennacchi 1988), as a function of funding costs and risks (Gorton and 
Pennacchi, 1995), and possibly as a way to diversify (Demsetz 1999).1 
In a recent paper, Dahiya, Puri, and Saunders (2000) test whether loan sales  
announcements provide a negative signal about the prospects of the borrower whose loan 
is sold by a bank.   They also examine, in a small sample (19 institutions), the 
characteristics of loan sellers.  They find that stock prices fall at the announcement of a 
loan sale and that many of the firms whose loans have been sold subsequently go 
bankrupt.  This evidence provides further support  for the idea that banks hold private 
information about their borrowers that makes loan sales difficult due to adverse selection. 
Another strand of the banking literature emphasizes the link between the internal 
capital markets and bank lending is more closely related to our study.  For instance, 
Houston, James, and Marcus (1997) report that lending at banks owned by multi-bank 
bank holding companies (BHCs) is less subject to changes in cash flow and capital.  
Jayaratne and Morgan (1999) find that shifts in deposit supply affects lending most at 
small, unaffiliated banks that do not have access to large internal capital markets.  Bank 
size also seems to allow banks to operate with less capital and, at the same time, engage 
in more lending.  Demsetz and Strahan (1997) show that larger BHCs manage to hold 
less capital and are able to pursue higher-risk activities, particularly C&I lending.  
Ackavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997) find that large banks following mergers tend to 
decrease their capital and increase their lending.  There also appears to be evidence that 
off-balance sheet activities in general and loan sales in particular help banking firms 
                                                 
1 For a review, See Berger and Udell (1987). 
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lower their capital levels to avoid regulatory taxes and improve their risk tolerance 
(Gorton and Haubrich 1990). 
The contribution of this paper is to go beyond the internal capital market, as 
measured by both bank size and access to a multi-bank BHC, and ask whether access to 
an external capital market – the loan sales market – acts in a complementary way.  If 
banks with access to bigger internal capital markets, big banks and banks in BHCs, hold 
less capital and lend more, then the same ought to be true for banks with better access to 
the external market.  We test this idea by estimating whether banks that buy and sell 
loans hold less capital and engage in more risky lending, even after controlling for their 
size and holding company affiliation as proxies for the effectiveness of the internal 
capital market.  Our empirical model can be viewed as a simple test of Froot, Scharfstein, 
and Stein’s model of risk management in which hedging activities add value by allowing 
the bank to conserve on costly capital, and by ensuring that sufficient internal funds are 
available to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities. 
 
III.  Empirical Methods and Results  
A. Methods and Data 
Decision making in banking is not and should not be compartmentalized.  Actions 
that affect capital structure, investment decisions, and portfolio risks are not taken in 
isolation.  It is quite the norm that a single action or trading decision affects all of the 
above.  A bank loan is not purely an investment; this decision also affects risk-based 
capital requirements, as well as firm risk (through multiple layers of credit, interest rate 
and other risks).  Detailed loan-level data for a broad cross-section of banks is not 
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available to the researcher.  Thus, one cannot observe how a particular loan decision 
affects the make up of the overall portfolio or its risk and capital implications.  We are 
therefore left to infer implications from aggregate data and aggregate actions. 
 Our data come from the year-end Reports of Income and Condition (the “Call  
Report”) for all domestic commercial banks in the United States.  Data on purchases and 
sales of C&I loans are only available from 1988 to 1993, so we are forced to restrict our 
analysis to the period 1989-1993 (1988 is not included since we use lagged values of loan 
sales/purchases). 
As noted above, our purpose is to test how risk management, as proxied by loan 
sales and purchases, affects a financial institution's capital structure, capital budgeting 
and profits.  We estimate a series of cross-sectional, reduced form regressions that relate 
measures of capital structure, investments in risky loans, and profits to control variables 
(designed to capture the extent of a bank’s access to an internal capital market) and to 
measures of the bank’s use of the loan sales market to foster risk management.   Our 
dependent variables are the following:   
 
Capital Structure Variables 
Capital/Assets ratio = Book value of equity / Assets 
Liquidity ratio = Cash + Federal Funds Sold + Securities / Assets  
Capital Budgeting Variables 
Commercial & Industrial Loans / Assets 
Commercial Real Estate Loans / Assets 
Commercial & Industrial Loans / Total Loans 
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Commercial Real Estate Loans / Total Loans 
Profit Variable 
 Return on Equity (ROE) = Net Income / Book value of Equity 
 
To capture the effect of internal capital markets (Jayaratne and Morgan 1999, 
Demsetz and Strahan 1997, Houston, James and Marcus 1997), we include as regressors 
indicator variables for banks owned by multi-bank holding companies and multi-state 
bank holding companies.  We also create indicators to capture the effect of firm size 
based on the bank’s total assets.  Following Demsetz (1999), we avoid imposing a linear 
(or log-linear) relationship between size and our dependent variables.  Instead, we include 
indicators for eight asset classes, with firms in asset size greater than $10 billion acting as 
the omitted category.2 
We need to be careful to isolate risk management activities in the loan sales 
market from other reasons why banks might buy or sell loans.  For instance, banks may 
sell (buy) in response to relatively strong (weak) loan demand conditions.  Similarly, 
unusually strong or weak funding conditions may induce loan sales activity.  To do this, 
we create three indicator variables to reflect a bank’s activities in the loan sales market: 
these indicate whether a bank only sells loans, whether it only buys loans, or whether it 
buys and sells loans, where those firms that do not participate are omitted.  We focus our 
attention on the last category, where demand and funding condition are unlikely to be 
driving the results. 
                                                 
2 All of our explanatory variables are predetermined in the sense that they are measured at the end of the 
year before the dependent variables are measured. 
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In a second set of specifications, we replace the indicator variables with the ratio 
of lagged gross sales (sales + purchases) of loans to total C&I loans, and the ratio of 
lagged net purchases (purchases - sales) of loans to total C&I loans.  The net purchases 
variable is included to control for loan demand or funding supply effects.  The gross loan 
sales ratio measures how aggressively a bank manages or rebalances its loan portfolio.  
Our theory suggests that banks that engage more actively in risk management in this way 
will be able to conserve on capital and operate with fewer liquid assets.  At the same 
time, it will be able to take advantage of more risky lending opportunities without unduly 
increasing its credit risk. 
B. Results 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the data.  The sample contains about 
60,000 bank/year observations.  We dropped observations that contained obviously 
incorrect data.  For example, we dropped observations where the balance sheet ratios 
exceed 1.  In addition, we dropped the profit variable (ROE) when book value of equity 
was negative.  We also deleted large outliers.  For the loan sales variables, we dropped 
cases where the net sales ratio fell outside the range of +1/-1 and where the gross sales 
ratio fell outside the range 0/1.  (These observations are not dropped in the indicator 
variable specification.)  We also dropped banks with ROE above 20% or below –20%. 
We also report mean characteristics in Table 1 for banks that buy loans, sell loans, 
buy and sell loans, or do neither.  These simple comparisons suggest that banks that buy 
and sell loans have the lowest capital-asset and liquid assets ratios and the highest levels 
of risky loans, either as a percentage of the balance sheet or as a percentage of total loans.  
They also have the highest profits.  On its face, these comparisons support the idea that 
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active risk management via the external loan sales market adds value to the banks by 
allowing them to conserve on capital and liquid assets and engage more in the activity 
that generates value – risky lending.  Of course, the banks that buy and sell loans are also 
larger and more likely to affiliate with multi-bank and multi-state BHCs than the other 
banks.  Thus, these banks also seem to have access to a better (or at least bigger) internal 
capital market.  We now control for this effect in our regressions. 
 Table 2 reports our regression results for the capital-to-assets ratio.  Both BHC 
affiliation and increasing bank size seem to decrease the capital-asset ratio, suggesting 
that larger internal capital markets do allow banks to operate with a smaller cushion 
against insolvency.  In contrast, and somewhat to our surprise, however, banks affiliated 
with multi-state BHCs do not seem to hold less capital.  Our two measures of risk 
management both suggest that banks can conserve on capital by actively managing their 
credit risk through loan sales.  The Buy-Sell variables are significant (both economically 
and statistically) in all years; they suggest that banks that manage their credit risk by both 
buying and selling loans have capital-asset ratios 1.5 to 1.9 percentage points lower than 
banks that do not participate at all in the market.  Perhaps more important, the banks that 
appear to rebalance their risk through both purchase and sale have capital-asset ratios 
about 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points lower than banks that just sell loans. 
In our second specification, we find that the gross loan sales variable enters the 
regression with a negative and significant coefficient in all years, lending further support 
to our earlier results with the indicator variables.  Banks that rebalance their loan 
portfolios by both buying and selling loans aggresively have lower capital.  We can draw 
this inference because we hold constant the net loans purchased in the regression.  The 
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coefficients suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the gross loan sales variable 
is associated with a decline in the capital-asset ratio of about 0.4 percentage points. 
 The results for the cash+securities-to-assets ratio provide further support to our 
expectations that firms that engage in loan trading can afford to reduce their buffer of 
liquid assets.  Once again, as shown in Table 3, control variables perform as expected -- 
large banks affiliated with BHCs (especially multi-state BHCs) hold fewer liquid assets.  
Moreoever, we again find that banks that both buy and sell loans hold the lowest level of 
liquid assets, although the contrast between these banks and the sell-only banks is less 
striking than in the capital equation.  In the specification using gross loan sales, however, 
we see clearly that banks with higher gross sales hold lower levels of liquid assets on the 
balance sheet.  For instance, a one standard deviation increase in gross loan sales leads to 
a decline in cash+securities-to-assets of about 1.3 percentage points.   
Overall, Tables 2 and 3 suggest that risk management via the loan sales market 
affects banks capital structure decisions.  In Tables 4-7, we show that credit risk 
management also affects capital budgeting decisions -- banks that use the loan sales 
market to manage credit risk invest more.  In Tables 4 and 5, we use the ratio of C&I 
loans and commercial real estate loans to total assets, and in Tables 6 and 7 we scale the 
two categories of risky loans by total loans.  The results, after controlling for size and 
BHC affiliation, provide resounding support for our hypothesis. 
Looking closely at Table 4 (C&I loans per dollar of assets), we find that, at a 
minimum, C&I loans-to-assets is three percentage points higher on average at banks that 
buy and sell loans compared to banks that do not participate in the loan sales market.  
Moreover, the buy and sell banks hold C&I loans-to-assets ratio about 1 to 1.5 percentage 
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points higher than the banks that sell only, and about 2 to 3 percentage points higher than 
banks that buy only.  The specifications with gross loan sales suggest in every year that 
banks doing more rebalancing of their loan portfolio invest more.  In particular, a one 
standard deviation increase in gross loan sales is associated with an increase in the C&I 
loans-to-assets ratio of 0.2 to 0.5 percentage points. 
Tables 6 and 7 report the loan portfolio implications, and the results are even 
more dramatic.  In the case of C&I loans, we observe as low as 3.6% and as high as 6.3% 
increases in holdings as compared to the absence of loan sales group.  Comparing the 
loan sellers with the buy and sell group, we find the latter banks hold 0.8% to 1.5% 
higher levels of C&I loans.  These results are echoed by the gross sales ratio regressions.  
Overall, these results suggest that increased risk management allows banks to invest more 
aggressively in risky lending.  
C.  If Risk Management is so good, why doesn’t everyone do it? 
 We have shown that banks that manage their risks appear better off.  They can 
operate with less capital and hold fewer liquid assets on their balance sheet.  Both of 
these effects should raise profits.  We have also shown that banks with more active risk 
management engage in more risky lending – lending to business – rather than safe 
lending (consumer and residential real estate).   
What explains the banks that don’t manage their risks through the loan sales 
market?  One explanation is that loans with private information are hard to sell at arm’s 
length unless a bank has established a strong reputation over time in this market.  In fact, 
the recent results by Dahiya, Puri, and Saunders are consistent with this view. 
Alternatively, there may be poorly managed banks that have been able to persist in the 
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U.S. due to regulations that reduce competitive pressures and government subsidies (see 
Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998 and Berger, Kashyap and Scalise, 1995). 
To test whether risk management really is a good thing, our last set of regressions 
looks at the relationship between loan sales and bank profits (Table 8).  Consistent with 
all of the previous results, we find that the risk managers – the banks that both buy and 
sell loans or the banks that generate a greater gross volume of loans sales and purchases – 
have higher profits.  The buy and sell group, for example, earn 2.8 to 3.1 percentage 
points higher ROE than banks that do not participate in loan sales at all.  In addition, in 
every year the buy and sell banks earn more than either the sell only or buy only banks.  
In the gross loan sales specification, we find that a standard deviation increase in gross 
sales leads to an increase in ROE of 0.6 to 1.2 percentage points. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
We have long been intrigued by the mechanisms through which banks seem to 
cater to many and opposing needs.  Liquidity, profitability, and solvency goals seem to 
cross paths and by and large contradict one another.  The extant empirical literature for 
non-financial firms indicates that active risk management provides a way to manage 
liquidity and cash flow and achieve higher investment. 
We have considered the case of the loan sales market as one tool (that we can 
measure empirically) which banks use to align their risk management, capital budgeting 
and capital structure goals.  The focus in the banking literature has been on how banks 
use their internal capital markets.  Our results support these studies, since we find that 
bigger banks affiliated with BHCs enjoy lower capital ratios and higher lending.  We 
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extend these results by showing that access and aggresive use of an external capital 
market – the loan sales market – leads to the same effects.  Loan sales activity allows a 
bank to hold less capital, invest less in low-yield high-liquidity assets, while at the same 
time increase its holdings of higher-risk higher-return assets.  The results are particularly 
strong for those banks that actively buy and sell loans.  We also find profitability 
increases as loan sales and purchases are conducted at a bank. 
We conclude that the banks that engage in both buying and selling of loans are 
better able to take advantage of positive NPV investment opportunities, as they are able 
to increase their C&I and CRE loans, are better able to manage with less liquidity and 
less capital.  The buying and selling of loans at the same time seems to allow banks to be 
more flexible and more aggressive.  The flexibility reduces the burden of carrying more 
capital, and lower yield higher liquidity assets; and the aggressiveness allows them to 
increase their higher risk and higher yield assets.  Clearly there is more to risk 
management than loan sales.  In recent years we have seen banks trade credit risks using 
credit derivatives, and we have seen the emergence of sophisticated credit risk 
measurement systems that take account of correlations across borrowers in different 
industries, countries and market segments.  Our results suggest that these developments 
are healthy ones that will increase the availability of bank credit.  Rigorous testing of the 
effects of these new technologies will have to wait, however, for more time to pass and 
more data to be collected. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics   
  
 
    Full Sample Statistics 
 
 
Buy Only 
 
 
Sell Only 
 
Buy and 
Sell 
Neither 
Buy nor 
Sell 
 
Variable 
 
Obs. 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Mean 
 
Mean 
 
Mean 
 
Mean 
Capital / Assets 
 
60,126 0.092 0.038 0.092 0.088 0.082 0.102 
Securities / Assets 
 
60,622 0.429 0.163 0.462 0.405 0.391 0.471 
C&I Loans / Assets 
 
60,549 0.101 0.089 0.089 0.105 0.121 0.077 
CRE / Assets 
 
60,623 0.090 0.084 0.084 0.095 0.106 0.070 
C&I Loans / Total Loans 
 
59,838 0.185 0.139 0.177 0.185 0.210 0.156 
CRE / Total Loans 
 
60,181 0.159 0.129 0.159 0.161 0.180 0.134 
ROE 
 
59,039 0.056 0.045 0.055 0.051 0.056 0.051 
Total Assets (Millions of $s) 
 
60,624 278 2,669 114 143 559 101 
In a Multi-bank Holding Company? 60,624 0.313 - 0.346 0.219 0.473 0.174 
In a Multi-state Holding Company? 60,624 0.124 - 0.113 0.091 0.182 0.081 
Sell  loans? 
 
59,868 0.188 -     
Buy loans? 
 
59,868 0.117 -     
Buy and sell loans? 
 
59,868 0.370 -     
Ratio of lagged gross sales to C&I 
loans 
 
51,366 0.175 0.238     
Ratio of lagged net purchases to 
C&I Loans  
53,851 -0.014 0.248     
 19
Table 2 
Dependant Variable: Capital to Asset Ratio   
 
 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
 Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales 
Constant 0.077** 
(0.002) 
 
0.070** 
(0.002) 
0.072** 
(0.002) 
0.066** 
(0.003) 
0.076** 
(0.002) 
0.069** 
(0.002) 
0.079** 
(0.002) 
0.075** 
(0.002) 
0.087** 
(0.002) 
0.081** 
(0.002) 
Multi-bank holding company 
 
-0.006** 
(0.001) 
 
-0.007** 
(0.001) 
-0.005** 
(0.001) 
-0.006** 
(0.001) 
-0.005** 
(0.001) 
-0.006** 
(0.001) 
-0.005** 
(0.001) 
-0.006** 
(0.001) 
-0.004** 
(0.001) 
-0.005** 
(0.001) 
Multi-state bank holding 
company 
0.001 
(0.001) 
 
1.85e-4 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.004** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.001) 
3.08e-4 
(0.001) 
Assets < $10 mil 
 
0.044** 
(0.003) 
 
0.044** 
(0.004) 
0.050** 
(0.003) 
0.048** 
(0.004) 
0.042** 
(0.003) 
0.040** 
(0.004) 
0.043** 
(0.004) 
0.038** 
(0.004) 
0.042** 
(0.004) 
0.041** 
(0.005) 
$10 mil < Assets < $25 mil 
 
0.028** 
(0.002) 
 
0.028** 
(0.002) 
0.033** 
(0.002) 
0.033** 
(0.003) 
0.030** 
(0.002) 
0.030** 
(0.003) 
0.027** 
(0.002) 
0.025** 
(0.002) 
0.023** 
(0.002) 
0.023** 
(0.002) 
$25 mil < Assets < $50 mil 
 
0.024** 
(0.002) 
 
0.025** 
(0.002) 
0.029** 
(0.002) 
0.029** 
(0.003) 
0.026** 
(0.002) 
0.026** 
(0.003) 
0.024** 
(0.002) 
0.022** 
(0.002) 
0.021** 
(0.002) 
0.021** 
(0.002) 
$50 mil < Assets < $100 mil 
 
0.022** 
(0.002) 
 
0.022** 
(0.002) 
0.026** 
(0.002) 
0.025** 
(0.003) 
0.022** 
(0.002) 
0.023** 
(0.003) 
0.020** 
(0.002) 
0.019** 
(0.002) 
0.018** 
(0.002) 
0.018** 
(0.002) 
$100 mil < Assets < $500 mil 
 
0.017** 
(0.002) 
 
0.015** 
(0.002) 
0.021** 
(0.002) 
0.019** 
(0.002) 
0.017** 
(0.002) 
0.016** 
(0.002) 
0.015** 
(0.002) 
0.013** 
(0.002) 
0.012** 
(0.002) 
0.012** 
(0.002) 
$500 mil < Assets < $1 bil 
 
0.011** 
(0.002) 
 
0.008** 
(0.002) 
0.015** 
(0.002) 
0.012** 
(0.003) 
0.012** 
(0.002) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.010** 
(0.002) 
0.006** 
(0.002) 
0.006** 
(0.002) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
$1 bil < Assets < $5 bil 
 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.013** 
(0.003) 
0.010** 
(0.003) 
0.011** 
(0.003) 
0.008* 
(0.003) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.007* 
(0.003) 
0.009** 
(0.002) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
$5 bil < Assets < $10 bil  
 
0.007** 
(0.002) 
 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
Sell loans 
 
-0.015** 
(0.001) 
 
- -0.014** 
(0.001) 
- -0.013** 
(0.001) 
- -0.010** 
(0.001) 
- -0.012* 
(0.001) 
- 
Buy loans 
 
-0.008** 
(0.001) 
 
- -0.009** 
(0.001) 
- -0.008** 
(0.001) 
- -0.007** 
(0.001) 
- -0.009** 
(0.001) 
- 
Buy and sell loans 
 
-0.019** 
(0.001) 
 
- -0.018** 
(0.001) 
- -0.016** 
(0.001) 
- -0.014** 
(0.001) 
- -0.015** 
(0.001) 
- 
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Ratio of lagged net purchases to 
C&I loans 
 
- 0.005** 
(0.001) 
- 0.004** 
(0.001) 
- 0.004** 
(0.001) 
- 1.70e-4 
(0.005) 
- 0.004** 
(0.001) 
Ratio of lagged gross sales to 
C&I loans  
- -0.017** 
(0.001) 
 
- -0.017** 
(0.001) 
- -0.014** 
(0.001) 
- -0.013** 
(0.004) 
- -0.013** 
(0.001) 
R2 
 
0.121 0.082 0.116 0.084 0.098 0.074 0.088 0.064 0.089 0.068 
N 12,654 11,059 12,277 10,677 11,932 10,302 11,536 9,927 11,092 9,350 
**Significant at the 1% level  *  Significant at the 5% level .  Assets above $10 billion is the omitted category for the size indicator variables.  Banks that neither buy nor sell loans constitute the omitted  
category for the sell and buy indicator variables.   
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Table 3 
Dependant Variable: Ratio of Securities to Assets   
 
 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
 Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales 
Constant 
 
0.275** 
(0.017) 
 
0.266** 
(0.022) 
0.289** 
(0.016) 
0.276** 
(0.020) 
0.293** 
(0.017) 
0.287** 
(0.020) 
0.322** 
(0.018) 
0.312** 
(0.019) 
0.345** 
(0.018) 
0.330** 
(0.021) 
Multi-bank holding company 
 
0.001 
(0.003) 
 
-0.009* 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.009* 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.004) 
Multi-state bank holding 
company 
-0.031** 
(0.005) 
 
-0.035** 
(0.005) 
-0.036** 
(0.006) 
-0.038** 
(0.006) 
-0.023** 
(0.006) 
-0.026** 
(0.006) 
-0.023** 
(0.006) 
-0.030** 
(0.006) 
-0.017** 
(0.006) 
-0.023** 
(0.006) 
Assets < $10 mil 
 
0.247** 
(0.018) 
 
0.229** 
(0.023) 
0.247** 
(0.018) 
0.230** 
(0.022) 
0.257** 
(0.019) 
0.226** 
(0.022) 
0.234** 
(0.020) 
0.212** 
(0.022) 
0.221** 
(0.020) 
0.209** 
(0.025) 
$10 mil < Assets < $25 mil 
 
0.212** 
(0.017) 
 
0.202** 
(0.022) 
0.199** 
(0.017) 
0.197** 
(0.020) 
0.201** 
(0.017) 
0.188** 
(0.020) 
0.174** 
(0.018) 
0.169** 
(0.019) 
0.158** 
(0.018) 
0.162** 
(0.022) 
$25 mil < Assets < $50 mil 
 
0.192** 
(0.017) 
 
0.182** 
(0.022) 
0.181** 
(0.016) 
0.177** 
(0.020) 
0.180** 
(0.017) 
0.167** 
(0.020) 
0.155** 
(0.018) 
0.149** 
(0.019) 
0.138** 
(0.018) 
0.140** 
(0.021) 
$50 mil < Assets < $100 mil 
 
0.179** 
(0.017) 
 
0.170** 
(0.022) 
0.169** 
(0.016) 
0.164** 
(0.020) 
0.175** 
(0.016) 
0.159** 
(0.020) 
0.152** 
(0.018) 
0.143** 
(0.019) 
0.129** 
(0.018) 
0.127** 
(0.021) 
$100 mil < Assets < $500 mil 
 
0.139** 
(0.016) 
 
0.131** 
(0.022) 
0.129** 
(0.016) 
0.124** 
(0.020) 
0.137** 
(0.017) 
0.122** 
(0.020) 
0.120** 
(0.017) 
0.113** 
(0.019) 
0.107** 
(0.017) 
0.105** 
(0.021) 
$500 mil < Assets < $1 bil 
 
0.077** 
(0.019) 
 
0.067** 
(0.023) 
0.068** 
(0.018) 
0.062** 
(0.021) 
0.086** 
(0.019) 
0.066** 
(0.021) 
0.087** 
(0.019) 
0.073** 
(0.020) 
0.070** 
(0.020) 
0.074** 
(0.023) 
$1 bil < Assets < $5 bil 
 
0.066** 
(0.018) 
 
0.050* 
(0.023) 
0.062** 
(0.018) 
0.045* 
(0.021) 
0.073** 
(0.019) 
0.051* 
(0.021) 
0.081** 
(0.020) 
0.063** 
(0.020) 
0.065** 
(0.020) 
0.061 
(0.023) 
$5 bil < Assets < $10 bil  
 
0.009 
(0.020) 
 
-0.007 
(0.024) 
0.006 
(0.021) 
-0.017 
(0.024) 
0.002 
(0.021) 
-0.018 
(0.024) 
0.009 
(0.023) 
0.005 
(0.024) 
-0.012 
(0.025) 
-0.007 
(0.027) 
Sell  loans 
 
-0.056** 
(0.004) 
 
- -0.060** 
(0.004) 
- -0.065** 
(0.004) 
- -0.060** 
(0.004) 
- -0.060** 
(0.004) 
- 
Buy loans 
 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
 
- 0.001 
(0.005) 
- -0.004 
(0.005) 
- -0.004 
(0.005) 
- -0.009 
(0.005) 
- 
Buy and sell loans 
 
-0.063** 
(0.003) 
 
- -0.057** 
(0.004) 
- -0.066** 
(0.004) 
- -0.064** 
(0.004) 
- -0.069** 
(0.004) 
- 
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Ratio of lagged net purchases to 
C&I loans 
- 
 
 
0. 076** 
(0.006) 
- 0.087** 
(0.006) 
- 0.067** 
(0.007) 
- 0.056** 
(0.007) 
- 0.060** 
(0.007) 
Ratio of lagged gross sales to 
C&I loans  
- 
 
 
-0.053** 
(0.006) 
- -0.047** 
(0.006) 
- -0.057** 
(0.006) 
- -0.056** 
(0.006) 
- -0.068** 
(0.006) 
R2 
 
0.125 0.110 0.124 0.111 0.115 0.091 0.094 0.073 0.092 0.072 
N 12,722 11,070 12,348 10,686 12,009 10,311 11,617 9,937 11,170 9,362 
**Significant at the 1% level  *  Significant at the 5% level .  Assets above $10 billion is the omitted category for the size indicator variables.  Banks that neither buy nor sell loans constitute the omitted  
category for the sell and buy indicator variables.   
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Table 4 
Dependant Variable: Ratio of C&I Loans to Assets   
 
 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
 Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales 
Constant 
 
0.186** 
(0.017) 
 
0.205** 
(0.022) 
0.187** 
(0.015) 
0.193** 
(0.016) 
0.176** 
(0.013) 
0.191** 
(0.016) 
0.173** 
(0.017) 
0.197** 
(0.019) 
0.149** 
(0.013) 
0.170** 
(0.016) 
Multi-bank holding company 
 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
 
0.005 
(0.002) 
-0.005* 
(0.002) 
0.006 
(0.002) 
-0.007** 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Multi-state bank holding 
company 
-0.007* 
(0.003) 
 
-0.005** 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-2.97e-4 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
Assets < $10 mil 
 
-0.121** 
(0.017) 
 
-0.114** 
(0.022) 
-0.129** 
(0.015) 
-0.113** 
(0.017) 
-0.129** 
(0.014) 
-0.115** 
(0.017) 
-0.130** 
(0.017) 
-0.134** 
(0.019) 
-0.108** 
(0.014) 
-0.109** 
(0.017) 
$10 mil < Assets < $25 mil 
 
-0.108** 
(0.017) 
 
-0.106** 
(0.022) 
-0.111** 
(0.015) 
-0.099** 
(0.016) 
-0.110** 
(0.013) 
-0.106** 
(0.016) 
-0.113** 
(0.017) 
-0.121** 
(0.019) 
-0.091** 
(0.013) 
-0.095** 
(0.016) 
$25 mil < Assets < $50 mil 
 
-0.096** 
(0.017) 
 
-0.096** 
(0.022) 
-0.102** 
(0.015) 
-0.092** 
(0.016) 
-0.101** 
(0.013) 
-0.098** 
(0.016) 
-0.102** 
(0.017) 
-0.111** 
(0.019) 
-0.080** 
(0.013) 
-0.086** 
(0.016) 
$50 mil < Assets < $100 mil 
 
-0.090** 
(0.017) 
 
-0.091** 
(0.022) 
-0.099** 
(0.015) 
-0.089** 
(0.016) 
-0.098** 
(0.013) 
-0.096** 
(0.016) 
-0.099** 
(0.017) 
-0.110** 
(0.019) 
-0.078** 
(0.013) 
-0.084** 
(0.016) 
$100 mil < Assets < $500 mil 
 
-0.074** 
(0.017) 
 
-0.070** 
(0.022) 
-0.084** 
(0.015) 
-0.071** 
(0.016) 
-0.084** 
(0.013) 
-0.079** 
(0.016) 
-0.085** 
(0.017) 
-0.093** 
(0.019) 
-0.067** 
(0.013) 
-0.073** 
(0.016) 
$500 mil < Assets < $1 bil 
 
-0.041* 
(0.019) 
 
-0.039 
(0.023) 
-0.063** 
(0.016) 
-0.044* 
(0.017) 
-0.069** 
(0.014) 
-0.060** 
(0.017) 
-0.069** 
(0.018) 
-0.074** 
(0.020) 
-0.053** 
(0.014) 
-0.055** 
(0.017) 
$1 bil < Assets < $5 bil 
 
-0.036* 
(0.018) 
 
-0.022 
(0.023) 
-0.047** 
(0.016) 
-0.030 
(0.017) 
-0.049** 
(0.015) 
-0.035* 
(0.017) 
-0.053** 
(0.018) 
-0.045* 
(0.020) 
-0.040** 
(0.015) 
-0.041* 
(0.018) 
$5 bil < Assets < $10 bil  
 
-0.011 
(0.023) 
 
0.010 
(0.027) 
-0.036 
(0.020) 
-0.018 
(0.021) 
-0.039* 
(0.017) 
-0.015 
(0.019) 
-0.045* 
(0.020) 
-0.051* 
(0.022) 
-0.029 
(0.017) 
-0.031 
(0.019) 
Sell  loans 
 
0.029** 
(0.002) 
 
- 0.024** 
(0.002) 
- 0.027** 
(0.002) 
- 0.025** 
(0.002) 
- 0.023** 
(0.002) 
- 
Buy loans 
 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
 
- 0.007** 
(0.002) 
- 0.016** 
(0.002) 
- 0.013** 
(0.002) 
- 0.009** 
(0.002) 
- 
Buy and sell loans 
 
0.045** 
(0.002) 
 
- 0.039** 
(0.002) 
- 0.042** 
(0.002) 
- 0.036** 
(0.002) 
- 0.031** 
(0.002) 
- 
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Ratio of lagged net purchases to 
C&I loans 
- 
 
 
-0.023** 
(0.004) 
- -0.026** 
(0.003) 
- -0.019** 
(0.004) 
- -0.018** 
(0.004) 
- -0.017** 
(0.003) 
Ratio of lagged gross sales to 
C&I loans  
- 
 
 
0.018** 
(0.004) 
- 0.015** 
(0.003) 
- 0.018** 
(0.003) 
- 0.022** 
(0.003) 
- 0.009** 
(0.003) 
R2 
 
0.084 0.048 0.076 0.042 
 
0.086 0.045 0.085 0.054 0.066 0.033 
N 12,706 11,057 12,341 10,680 12,003 10,307 11,612 9,933 11,165 9,357 
**Significant at the 1% level  *  Significant at the 5% level .  Assets above $10 billion is the omitted category for the size indicator variables.  Banks that neither buy nor sell loans constitute the omitted  
category for the sell and buy indicator variables.   
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Table 5 
Dependant Variable: Ratio of CRE to Assets   
 
 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
 
 
Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales 
Constant 
 
0.082** 
(0.010) 
 
0.092** 
(0.014) 
0.101** 
(0.010) 
0.120** 
(0.013) 
0.085** 
(0.009) 
0.101** 
(0.012) 
0.077** 
(0.008) 
0.095** 
(0.009) 
0.071** 
(0.007) 
0.089** 
(0.008) 
Multi-bank holding company 1.71e-4 
(0.002) 
 
-1.28e-4 
(0.002) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.007** 
(0.002) 
-0.005* 
(0.002) 
-0.008** 
(0.002) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.008** 
(0.002) 
-0.005* 
(0.002) 
Multi-state bank holding company -0.001 
(0.003) 
 
0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
2.37E-4 
(0.003) 
-3.64e-4 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
Assets < $10 mil 
 
-0.058** 
(0.010) 
 
-0.061** 
(0.014) 
-0.082** 
(0.010) 
-0.094** 
(0.013) 
-0.070** 
(0.009) 
-0.077** 
(0.012) 
-0.061** 
(0.008) 
-0.069** 
(0.009) 
-0.055** 
(0.007) 
-0.061** 
(0.009) 
$10 mil < Assets < $25 mil 
 
-0.040** 
(0.010) 
 
-0.043** 
(0.014) 
-0.058** 
(0.010) 
-0.070** 
(0.013) 
-0.044** 
(0.009) 
-0.052** 
(0.012) 
-0.036** 
(0.008) 
-0.044** 
(0.009) 
-0.032** 
(0.007) 
-0.041** 
(0.008) 
$25 mil < Assets < $50 mil 
 
-0.017 
(0.010) 
 
-0.020 
(0.014) 
-0.035** 
(0.010) 
-0.047** 
(0.013) 
-0.017 
(0.009) 
-0.024* 
(0.012) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.015 
(0.009) 
4.01e-4 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
$50 mil < Assets < $100 mil 
 
0.004 
(0.010) 
 
1.24e-4 
(0.014) 
-0.014 
(0.010) 
-0.027* 
(0.013) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
0.014 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.022 
(0.007) 
0.015 
(0.008) 
$100 mil < Assets < $500 mil 
 
0.023* 
(0.010) 
 
0.023 
(0.014) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
0.026** 
(0.009) 
0.020 
(0.012) 
0.036** 
(0.008) 
0.029** 
(0.009) 
0.043** 
(0.007) 
0.037** 
(0.008) 
$500 mil < Assets < $1 bil 
 
0.045** 
(0.012) 
 
0.045** 
(0.015) 
0.025* 
(0.011) 
0.022 
(0.014) 
0.042** 
(0.010) 
0.046** 
(0.013) 
0.046** 
(0.009) 
0.047** 
(0.010s) 
0.046** 
(0.008) 
0.050** 
(0.009) 
$1 bil < Assets < $5 bil 
 
0.028** 
(0.011) 
 
0.037** 
(0.014) 
0.016 
(0.011) 
0.016 
(0.013) 
0.026* 
(0.010) 
0.031* 
(0.013) 
0.027** 
(0.009) 
0.030** 
(0.010) 
0.034** 
(0.008) 
0.035** 
(0.009) 
$5 bil < Assets < $10 bil  
 
0.020 
(0.013) 
 
0.029 
(0.016) 
-0.005 
(0.013) 
-0.009** 
(0.016) 
0.015 
(0.013) 
0.027 
(0.015) 
0.024 
(0.014) 
0.028 
(0.016) 
0.027* 
(0.013) 
0.034* 
(0.015) 
Sell  loans 
 
0.018** 
(0.002) 
 
- 0.020** 
(0.002) 
- 0.022** 
(0.002) 
- 0.021** 
(0.002) 
- 0.028** 
(0.002) 
- 
Buy loans 
 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
 
- 0.007** 
(0.002) 
- 0.010** 
(0.002) 
- 0.016** 
(0.003) 
- 0.016** 
(0.003) 
- 
Buy and sell loans 0.029** 
(0.002) 
 
- 0.028** 
(0.002) 
- 0.029** 
(0.002) 
- 0.030** 
(0.002) 
- 0.031** 
(0.002) 
- 
Ratio of lagged net purchases to 
C&I loans 
 
- 
 
 
-0.016** 
(0.003) 
- -0.022* 
(0.004) 
- -0.014** 
(0.004) 
- -0.013** 
(0.004) 
- -0.015** 
(0.004) 
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Ratio of lagged gross sales to C&I 
loans  
- 
 
 
0.034** 
(0.003) 
- 0.036** 
(0.003) 
- 0.030** 
(0.003) 
- 0.025** 
(0.004) 
- 0.029** 
(0.004) 
R2 
 
0.147 0.141 0.148 0.146 0.147 0.134 0.132 0.122 0.131 0.121 
N 12,722 11,070 12,348 10,686 12,009 10,311 11,618 9,937 11,170 9,362 
**Significant at the 1% level  *  Significant at the 5% level .  Assets above $10 billion is the omitted category for the size indicator variables.  Banks that neither buy nor sell loans constitute the omitted  
category for the sell and buy indicator variables.   
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Table 6 
Dependant Variable: Ratio of C&I Loans To Total Loans   
 
 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
 Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales 
Constant 
 
0.314** 
(0.024) 
 
0.340** 
(0.031) 
0.321** 
(0.025) 
0.328** 
(0.025) 
0.307** 
(0.020) 
0.325** 
(0.022) 
0.319** 
(0.026) 
0.349** 
(0.027) 
0.279** 
(0.022) 
0.307** 
(0.026) 
Multi-bank holding company 
 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.003) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.012** 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.010** 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Multi-state bank holding 
company 
-0.022** 
(0.005) 
 
-0.020** 
(0.005) 
-0.011* 
(0.005) 
-0.018** 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.005) 
-0.011* 
(0.005) 
-0.019** 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.011* 
(0.005) 
Assets < $10 mil 
 
-0.172** 
(0.025) 
 
-0.160** 
(0.032) 
-0.185** 
(0.026) 
-0.163** 
(0.026) 
-0.197** 
(0.020) 
-0.174** 
(0.023) 
-0.205** 
(0.026) 
-0.205** 
(0.028) 
-0.166** 
(0.022) 
-0.163** 
(0.027) 
$10 mil < Assets < $25 mil 
 
-0.156** 
(0.024) 
 
-0.150** 
(0.032) 
-0.164** 
(0.025) 
-0.146** 
(0.026) 
-0.168** 
(0.020) 
-0.157** 
(0.022) 
-0.188** 
(0.026) 
-0.192** 
(0.028) 
-0.154** 
(0.022) 
-0.154** 
(0.026) 
$25 mil < Assets < $50 mil 
 
-0.139** 
(0.024) 
 
-0.137** 
(0.032) 
-0.153** 
(0.025) 
-0.138** 
(0.025) 
-0.155** 
(0.020) 
-0.146** 
(0.022) 
-0.175** 
(0.026) 
-0.181** 
(0.027) 
-0.138** 
(0.022) 
-0.142** 
(0.026) 
$50 mil < Assets < $100 mil 
 
-0.131** 
(0.024) 
 
-0.131** 
(0.031) 
-0.149** 
(0.025) 
-0.136** 
(0.025) 
-0.150** 
(0.020) 
-0.143** 
(0.022) 
-0.167** 
(0.026) 
-0.177** 
(0.027) 
-0.135** 
(0.022) 
-0.141** 
(0.026) 
$100 mil < Assets < $500 mil 
 
-0.114** 
(0.024) 
 
-0.106** 
(0.031) 
-0.132** 
(0.025) 
-0.113** 
(0.025) 
-0.134** 
(0.020) 
-0.122** 
(0.022) 
-0.148** 
(0.025) 
-0.154** 
(0.027) 
-0.118** 
(0.021) 
-0.124** 
(0.026) 
$500 mil < Assets < $1 bil 
 
-0.098** 
(0.026) 
 
-0.089** 
(0.033) 
-0.111** 
(0.027) 
-0.087** 
(0.027) 
-0.120** 
(0.021) 
-0.103** 
(0.023) 
-0.120** 
(0.028) 
-0.128** 
(0.029) 
-0.096** 
(0.023) 
-0.096** 
(0.027) 
$1 bil < Assets < $5 bil 
 
-0.075** 
(0.026) 
 
-0.054 
(0.033) 
-0.092** 
(0.026) 
-0.069* 
(0.027) 
-0.091** 
(0.022) 
-0.066** 
(0.024) 
-0.102** 
(0.027) 
-0.086** 
(0.029) 
-0.083** 
(0.023) 
-0.081** 
(0.028) 
$5 bil < Assets < $10 bil  
 
-0.049 
(0.032) 
 
-0.015 
(0.037) 
-0.075* 
(0.032) 
-0.049 
(0.033) 
-0.068* 
(0.029) 
-0.025 
(0.031) 
-0.094** 
(0.031) 
-0.095** 
(0.032) 
-0.059 
(0.030) 
-0.055 
(0.034) 
Sell  loans 
 
0.035** 
(0.004) 
 
- 0.022** 
(0.004) 
- 0.031** 
(0.004) 
- 0.027** 
(0.003) 
- 0.027** 
(0.004) 
- 
Buy loans 
 
0.022** 
(0.004) 
 
- 0.015** 
(0.004) 
- 0.030** 
(0.004) 
- 0.023** 
(0.004) 
- 0.017** 
(0.004) 
- 
Buy and sell loans 
 
0.063** 
(0.003) 
 
- 0.051** 
(0.003) 
- 0.055** 
(0.003) 
- 0.045** 
(0.003) 
- 0.036** 
(0.003) 
- 
 28
Ratio of lagged net purchases to 
C&I loans 
- 
 
 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
- -0.016** 
(0.006) 
- -0.015* 
(0.006) 
- -0.011 
(0.006) 
- -0.009 
(0.006) 
Ratio of lagged gross sales to 
C&I loans  
- 
 
 
0.019** 
(0.006) 
- 0.014* 
(0.006) 
- 0.015** 
(0.005) 
- 0.024** 
(0.006) 
- 0.001 
(0.005) 
R2 
 
0.055 0.024 0.045 0.020 0.054 0.025 0.051 0.032 0.037 0.019 
N 12,594 11,016 12,232 10,645 11,903 10,287 11,506 9,917 11,051 9,330 
**Significant at the 1% level  *  Significant at the 5% level .  Assets above $10 billion is the omitted category for the size indicator variables.  Banks that neither buy nor sell loans constitute the omitted  
category for the sell and buy indicator variables.   
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Table 7 
Dependant Variable: Ratio of CRE To Total Loans   
 
 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
 Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales 
Constant 
 
0.139** 
(0.013) 
 
0.154** 
(0.018) 
0.169** 
(0.013) 
0.197** 
(0.017) 
0.146** 
(0.013) 
0.170** 
(0.016) 
0.142** 
(0.012) 
0.168** 
(0.012) 
0.138** 
(0.010) 
0.162** 
(0.011) 
Multi-bank holding company 
 
0.005 
(0.003) 
 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.003) 
-0.011** 
(0.003) 
-0.007* 
(0.003) 
-0.012** 
(0.003) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
Multi-state bank holding 
company 
-0.014** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.008 
(0.004) 
-0.014** 
(0.004) 
-0.009* 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.004) 
-0.010* 
(0.004) 
-0.013** 
(0.004) 
-0.011* 
(0.005) 
-0.023** 
(0.004) 
-0.023** 
(0.005) 
Assets < $10 mil 
 
-0.084** 
(0.014) 
 
-0.092** 
(0.018) 
-0.124** 
(0.013) 
-0.144** 
(0.017) 
-0.102** 
(0.013) 
-0.115** 
(0.017) 
-0.098** 
(0.012) 
-0.111** 
(0.013) 
-0.093** 
(0.011) 
-0.104** 
(0.013) 
$10 mil < Assets < $25 mil 
 
-0.055** 
(0.013) 
 
-0.062** 
(0.018) 
-0.081** 
(0.013) 
-0.101** 
(0.017) 
-0.061** 
(0.013) 
-0.075** 
(0.016) 
-0.056** 
(0.012) 
-0.069** 
(0.013) 
-0.055** 
(0.010) 
-0.066** 
(0.012) 
$25 mil < Assets < $50 mil 
 
-0.018 
(0.013) 
 
-0.024 
(0.018) 
-0.044** 
(0.013) 
-0.064** 
(0.017) 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
-0.028 
(0.016) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
-0.018 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.008 
(0.012) 
$50 mil < Assets < $100 mil 
 
0.017 
(0.013) 
 
0.010 
(0.018) 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
-0.029 
(0.017) 
0.019 
(0.013) 
0.004 
(0.016) 
0.031** 
(0.011) 
0.019 
(0.013) 
0.040** 
(0.010) 
0.031** 
(0.012) 
$100 mil < Assets < $500 mil 
 
0.040** 
(0.013) 
 
0.039* 
(0.018) 
0.023 
(0.013) 
0.008 
(0.017) 
0.050** 
(0.013) 
0.040* 
(0.016) 
0.063** 
(0.012) 
0.053** 
(0.012) 
0.075** 
(0.010) 
0.068** 
(0.011) 
$500 mil < Assets < $1 bil 
 
0.056** 
(0.015) 
 
0.057** 
(0.019) 
0.030* 
(0.015) 
0.025 
(0.018) 
0.065** 
(0.014) 
0.069** 
(0.018) 
0.078** 
(0.014) 
0.077** 
(0.014) 
0.078** 
(0.012) 
0.088** 
(0.013) 
$1 bil < Assets < $5 bil 
 
0.036* 
(0.014) 
 
0.048* 
(0.019) 
0.020 
(0.014) 
0.017 
(0.017) 
0.041** 
(0.014) 
0.048** 
(0.017) 
0.046** 
(0.013) 
0.049** 
(0.013) 
0.058** 
(0.011) 
0.062** 
(0.013) 
$5 bil < Assets < $10 bil  
 
0.021 
(0.018) 
 
0.034 
(0.022) 
-0.012 
(0.018) 
-0.021 
(0.021) 
0.022 
(0.017) 
0.036 
(0.021) 
0.032 
(0.018) 
0.036 
(0.020) 
0.032 
(0.017) 
0.043* 
(0.018) 
Sell  loans 
 
0.019** 
(0.003) 
 
- 0.019** 
(0.003) 
- 0.021** 
(0.003) 
- 0.021** 
(0.003) 
- 0.032** 
(0.004) 
- 
Buy loans 
 
0.011** 
(0.003) 
 
- 0.013** 
(0.004) 
- 0.018** 
(0.004) 
- 0.029** 
(0.004) 
- 0.029** 
(0.004) 
- 
Buy and sell loans 
 
0.038** 
(0.003) 
 
- 0.036** 
(0.003) 
- 0.035** 
(0.003) 
- 0.037** 
(0.003) 
- 0.037** 
(0.003) 
- 
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Ratio of lagged net purchases to 
C&I loans 
- 
 
 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
- -0.011 
(0.006) 
- -0.006 
(0.006) 
- -0.005 
(0.006) 
- -0.064 
(0.006) 
Ratio of lagged gross sales to 
C&I loans  
- 
 
 
0.047** 
(0.005) 
- 0.048** 
(0.005) 
- 0.037** 
(0.005) 
- 0.029** 
(0.005) 
- 0.033** 
(0.006) 
R2 
 
0.134 0.131 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.134 0.137 0.131 0.137 0.134 
N 12,654 11,069 12,273 10,682 11,932 10,310 11,529 9,931 11,087 9,358 
**Significant at the 1% level  *  Significant at the 5% level .  Assets above $10 billion is the omitted category for the size indicator variables.  Banks that neither buy nor sell loans constitute the omitted  
category for the sell and buy indicator variables.   
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Table 8 
Dependant Variable: Ratio of Net Income To Equity   
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
 Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross sales Indicator Gross 
sales 
Constant 
 
0.079** 
(0.006) 
 
0.077** 
(0.007) 
0.039** 
(0.013) 
0.028 
(0.015) 
0.045** 
(0.009) 
0.050** 
(0.012) 
0.066** 
(0.006) 
0.069** 
(0.006) 
0.069** 
(0.005) 
0.069** 
(0.006) 
Multi-bank holding company 
 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.006** 
(0.001) 
0.006** 
(0.001) 
0.007** 
(0.001) 
0.007** 
(0.001) 
0.008** 
(0.001) 
0.008** 
(0.001) 
0.008** 
(0.001) 
0.007** 
(0.001) 
Multi-state bank holding 
company 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
 
0.006** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Assets < $10 mil 
 
-0.039** 
(0.006) 
 
-0.037** 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
0.010 
(0.016) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
-0.018 
(0.013) 
-0.020** 
(0.006) 
-0.024** 
(0.007) 
-0.026** 
(0.005) 
-0.026** 
(0.007) 
$10 mil < Assets < $25 mil 
 
-0.032** 
(0.006) 
 
-0.029** 
(0.007) 
4.99e-5 
(0.013) 
0.011 
(0.015) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
-0.012 
(0.006) 
-0.012* 
(0.005) 
-0.011 
(0.006) 
$25 mil < Assets < $50 mil 
 
-0.026** 
(0.006) 
 
-0.024** 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.013) 
0.020 
(0.015) 
-3.42e-4 
(0.009) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
$50 mil < Assets < $100 mil 
 
-0.021** 
(0.006) 
 
-0.019* 
(0.007) 
0.013 
(0.013) 
0.025 
(0.015) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
$100 mil < Assets < $500 mil 
 
-0.014* 
(0.006) 
 
-0.012 
(0.007) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
0.029 
(0.015) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
2.18e-4 
(0.005) 
2.47e-4 
(0.006) 
$500 mil < Assets < $1 bil 
 
-0.013* 
(0.006) 
 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
0.015 
(0.013) 
0.030 
(0.016) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-3.13e-4 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
$1 bil < Assets < $5 bil 
 
-0.013* 
(0.006) 
 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.013) 
0.016 
(0.016) 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.012 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
$5 bil < Assets < $10 bil  
 
-0.015 
(0.008) 
 
-0.016 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.015) 
0.018 
(0.018) 
0.007 
(0.012) 
-2.52e-4 
(0.014) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
Sell  loans 
 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
 
- 0.003* 
(0.001) 
- 0.002 
(0.001) 
- -0.002 
(0.001) 
- -3.65e-4 
(0.001) 
- 
Buy loans 
 
-0.001** 
(0.001) 
 
- 0.002 
(0.001) 
- 0.003* 
(0.001) 
- 7.13e-4 
(0.001) 
- 3.21e-4 
(0.001) 
- 
Buy and sell loans 
 
0.037** 
(0.001) 
 
- 0.003** 
(0.001) 
- 0.003** 
(0.001) 
- 0.002 
(0.001) 
- 0.003** 
(0.001) 
- 
 32
Ratio of lagged net purchases to 
C&I loans 
- 
 
 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
- -0.001 
(0.002) 
- 0.007** 
(0.002) 
- 0.005* 
(0.002) 
- 3.10e-4 
(0.002) 
Ratio of lagged gross sales to 
C&I loans  
- 
 
 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
- 0.006** 
(0.002) 
- 0.005** 
(0.002) 
- 0.001 
(0.002) 
- 0.003 
(0.002) 
R2 
 
0.040 0.041 0.034 0.036 0.022 0.023 0.017 0.014 0.034 0.029 
N 12,273 10,700 11,977 10,376 11,684 10,051 11,412 9,776 10,963 9,214 
**Significant at the 1% level  *  Significant at the 5% level .  Assets above $10 billion is the omitted category for the size indicator variables.  Banks that neither buy nor sell loans constitute the omitted  
category for the sell and buy indicator variables.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
